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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Victor Arvizu pied guilty to two counts of battery 
on jail staff. He received an aggregate unified sentence of five years, with one year 
fixed. The district court initially placed Mr. Arvizu on probation; however, after he was 
found to have violated his probation, the district court revoked his probation. 
On appeal, Mr. Arvizu asserts that the district court erred in revoking his 
probation where the violation was not willful, and, assuming arguendo it was willful, it 
did not warrant revocation. Additionally, Mr. Arvizu asserts that the district court 
deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection when it 
revoked his probation because the court believed Mr. Arvizu was mentally ill and was 
not taking mental health medications. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On June 1, 2012, Vincent Arvizu was being housed in jail due to a pending 
stalking charge. 1 (PSI, pp.3, 6-7.) When additional jail staff (in the form of a Special 
Response Team) arrived to secure Mr. Arvizu, who was hiding from corrections officers 
in his shower, Mr. Arvizu threw some red liquid at the staff members.2 (PSI, p.3.) 
The district court ordered a mental evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 18-211 and 
thereafter ordered Mr. Arvizu committed to the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Health & Welfare pursuant to I.C. § 18-212. (R., pp.31, 44-45.) Mr. Arvizu was 
1 Although he was initially charged with felony stalking, the charge was reduced to 
misdemeanor stalking. (PSI, pp.6-7.) 
2 The red liquid was a mixture of fruit punch and mouthwash. (PSI, p.3.) 
1 
committed for several months.3 (PSI, p.19.) After his competency was restored, 
Arvizu waived his preliminary hearing. (R., p.62.) Mr. Arvizu was charged by 
information with four counts of battery on jail staff. (R., pp.63-65.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Arvizu pied guilty to two counts of battery on 
jail staff. (R., pp.68-75.) As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining charges, and to recommend a suspended sentence of five years, with one 
year fixed, on each count, to be served concurrently. (R., pp.68-75.) The district court 
accepted the plea and set the matter for sentencing. (R., p.68.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Mr. Arvizu to an aggregate 
unified term of five years, with one year fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed 
Mr. Arvizu on probation for five years. (R., pp.80-85.) Mr. Arvizu timely appealed from 
the Judgment of Conviction.4 (R., pp.87-89.) 
On October 30, 2013, Mr. Arvizu filed a prose motion for correction or reduction 
of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (Supplemental Record ("Supp. R.") 5, pp.13-21.) On 
November 5, 2013, the district court denied the motion without a hearing. (Supp. 
R., pp.41-42.) 
On August 8, 2014, the State filed a report of probation violation in which it 
asserted that Mr. Arivizu violated his probation by failing to get a mental health 
3 Upon his release on April 4, 2013, his discharge summary indicated Mr. Arvizu "has no 
known history of assault, was not assaultive at SHS, and is considered a low risk for 
future assaultive behaviors." (PSI, p.24.) 
4 A brief was never filed in Supreme Court No. 41245, the appeal was dismissed on 
January 7, 2015 and a remittitur was issued. (Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository). 
5 On June 30, 2015, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered the record on appeal to be 
augmented to include the Supreme Court file, Clerk's Record, and Reporter's 
Transcripts filed electronically ir:, prior appeal No. 41245, and further ordered a limited 
clerk's record to be prepared in appeal No. 43182. (Supp. R., p.2.) Mr. Arvizu shall 
refer herein to the Limited Clerk's Record as the Supplemental Record. 
2 
evaluation and by failing to take his prescribed mental health medication. (Supp. 
R., pp.84-89.) After a hearing, the district court found Mr. Arvizu violated one of the 
conditions of his probation and revoked his probation. (Supp. R., pp.169-1 On 
April 16, 2015, Mr. Arvizu filed a timely notice of appeal. (Supp. R., pp.173-175.) 
3 
ISSUES 
1 the district court abuse its discretion in revoking Mr. Arvizu's probation? 
2. In revoking Mr. Arvizu's probation, did the district court violate Mr. Arvizu's 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Arvizu's Probation 
A Introduction 
Mr. Arvizu asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation, because the probation violation did not warrant revocation, and the district 
court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards where, pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f), a district court may revoke probation only for a willful violation 
of a condition of probation. 
The district court found Mr. Arvizu violated a term or condition of his probation by 
not obtaining a mental health evaluation when told to do so by his probation officer. 
However, the probation violation at issue was non-willful as whether a mental health 
professional refused to assess Mr. Arivizu's mental health was beyond his control. 
Further, failing to obtain an evaluation did not warrant revocation of Mr. Arvizu's 
probation when the record was clear that Mr. Arvizu was otherwise compliant and doing 
well on his probation. Thus, the order revoking his probation must be vacated, with the 
case remanded for a new hearing. 
B. Applicable Standards Of Review 
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation 
proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the appellate court 
determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation." Id. "If it is 
determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second 
question is what should be the consequences of that violation." Id. 
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"A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal 
absent a showing that the court abused its discretion." Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105. In 
reviewing a district court's discretionary decision, appellate courts conduct an inquiry "to 
determine whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal 
standards, and reached its standards by an exercise of reason." Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Arvizu's Probation, 
Because It Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards Where 
It Revoked Mr. Arvizu's Probation For A Non-Willful Violation 
Mr. Arvizu did not admit to violating his probation. The district court found, after a 
hearing, that Mr. Arvizu had violated his probation by failing to obtain a mental health 
evaluation as lawfully instructed by his probation officer. (4/3/15 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) 
A probationer is entitled to due process throughout probation revocation 
proceedings. State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314 (1988); State v. Done, 139 Idaho 635, 
637 (Ct. App. 2004). A probationer must be given a due process hearing before 
probation can be revoked. Kelsey, 115 Idaho at 314. At the hearing, satisfactory proof 
of a violation of a probation condition or "any other cause satisfactory to the court" must 
be proven. Id. (citing l.C. §§ 19-2602, 20-222). 
The applicable legal standard the district court must use to determine whether to 
revoke probation depends on whether the violation was willful or non-willful. Id. "If a 
knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district court's decision 
to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 )). In deciding whether revocation of 
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the 
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is 
6 
consistent with the protection of society. State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
The State has the burden of showing that a probation violation was willful. See 
State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994). Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
33(f), a district court may revoke probation only for a willful violation of a condition of 
probation. I.C.R. 33(f). I.C.R. 33(f)6 states, in pertinent part: "[t]he court shall not 
revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the 
court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation." 
I.C.R. 33(f) (emphasis added). Because I.C.R. 33(f) uses the language "shall not," the 
restriction it imposes is mandatory. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760 (2002) 
(quoting Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848 (1995)). Thus, if a violation of a condition of 
probation is non-willful, a district court may not revoke probation. See I.C.R. 33(f). 
Idaho case law prior the effective date of the amendment to I.C.R. 33(f) indicates 
that a probation violation is non-willful where the probationer was not at fault or had no 
control over the violation See, e.g., Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 380, 382 (holding that the 
record was insufficient to show that a probationer willfully violated his probation, where 
the probationer, who was certified as one-hundred percent disabled, was involuntarily 
terminated from a halfway house program because he was unable to perform the 
carpentry work required as part of the program). 
Conversely, Idaho's appellate courts have held that a probation violation is willful 
where the probationer is responsible or at fault for the violation. See, e.g., State v. 
6 Effective July 31, 2015, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) was renumbered as I.C.R. 33(f). 
This amendment did not change the language of the subsection, which was 
substantively amended in 2012. See 4/23/14 Order "In Re: Amendment of Idaho 
Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 33." 
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Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that substantial evidence existed 
show that a probationer willfully violated his probation conditions, where the 
probationer missed a meeting with his probation officer, failed to contact the officer for 
several days because he was staying with friends and using drugs and alcohol at the 
time, and failed to attend a substance abuse program); State v. Fife, 114 Idaho 103, 
104-06 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the record supported the district court's finding of a 
willful probation violation, where firearms were found at a probationer's home after the 
probationer was informed he could not possess firearms and he indicated that he 
understood that condition). 
The State filed a probation violation which alleged that Mr. Arvizu violated his 
probation by failing to obtain a mental health evaluation. (Supp. R., pp.84-90.) 
Although Mr. Arvizu had just been released from State Hospital South on March 17, 
2014, his probation officer believed that Mr. Arvizu should be on medication for his 
mental health condition. (4/3/15 Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.5; Supp. R., pp.87-89.) The 
Report of Probation Violation provided, inter a/ia: 
On May 22, 2014, Mr. Arvizu was instructed, by his supervising probation 
officer, to complete a mental health assessment. Mr. Arvizu was provided 
information to obtain a free mental health assessment through the 
Department of Veteran's Affairs. Upon attending his scheduled 
appointment with the Department of Veteran's Affairs, he stated that he 
told them "I don't want to do this and my P.O. is making me." Because of 
these statements, the Department of Veteran's Affairs did not complete 
the mental health assessment. 
(Supp. R., pp.87-88.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Arvizu's probation officer testified that he ordered 
Mr. Arvizu to obtain a mental health evaluation at the Department of Veteran's Affairs 
8 
("the VA")7. (4/3/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.3-4.) Mr. Arvizu did go to the VA for an evaluation; 
however, apparently when Mr. Arvizu told the VA that his probation officer was making 
obtain a mental health evaluation, the VA professional refused to evaluate 
Mr. Arvizu. (4/3/15 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-12, p.21, Ls.2-5.) The district court found that the 
probation officer reasonably instructed Mr. Arvizu to obtain a mental health evaluation, 
but that Mr. Arvizu, by telling the VA that he was there against his will or was being told 
to do it, blocked the evaluation from happening.8 (4/10/15 Tr., p.15, L.22 - p.16, L.24.) 
The district court subsequently revoked Mr. Arvizu's probation. (4/3/15 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-
19; 4/10/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.13-18; Supp. R., pp.169-172.) When the district court revoked 
Mr. Arvizu's probation, the applicable legal standard from !.C.R. 33(f) permitted the 
district court to revoke probation only for a willful violation of a condition of probation. 
However, the alleged violation was not willful. 
Mr. Arvizu complied with his probation officer's directive and went to the VA but 
was denied a mental health evaluation Such was a condition beyond his control-he 
was not responsible or at fault for being denied an evaluation. Presumably the 
evaluator found Mr. Arvizu could not provide informed consent to perform the evaluation 
because he was not there of his own free will, but was being ordered to go by his 
probation officer. Such a conclusion by the evaluator was not unreasonable and was 
based on the truthful statements of Mr. Arvizu; however, a mental health care provider's 
professional judgment is not something within the control of Mr. Arvizu. He had no 
ability to force the provider to administer the evaluation. The district court erred when it 
determined that Mr. Arvizu violated his probation by failing to get a mental health 
7 Sixty-four year old Victor Arvizu served in the military for 21 years, in the Air Force. 
(PSI, pp.1, 8.) 
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evaluation, because this was not a willful violation and, pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f), the 
district court could not have revoked Mr. Arvizu's probation unless the violation was 
willful.9 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Revoking Mr. Arvizu's Probation As 
His Probation Violation Did Not Warrant Revocation 
The district court found Mr. Arvizu violated a condition of his probation by not 
obtaining a mental health evaluation when told to do so by his probation officer. As a 
result of this violation, the district court revoked his probation. However, failing to obtain 
an evaluation did not warrant revocation of Mr. Arvizu's probation when the record was 
clear that Mr. Arvizu was otherwise compliant and doing well on his probation. Thus, 
the order revoking his probation must be vacated, with the case remanded for a new 
hearing. 
Once a probation violation has been found, the district court must determine 
whether it is of such seriousness as to warrant revoking probation. State v. Chavez, 
134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). However, probation may not be revoked arbitrarily. 
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The district court must decide 
whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether probation is 
consistent with the protection of society. State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 
8 Implicitly, the district court found the probation officer had lawful authority to order 
Mr. Arvizu to obtain a mental health evaluation. (4/3/15 Tr., p.40, Ls.9-19.) 
9 Alternatively, even if the district court had discretion to revoke probation for non-willful 
violations, the district court still abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Arvizu's 
probation, because it did not adequately consider alternative methods to address 
the violation as required by Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105 (holding that "if a probationer's 
violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was beyond the probationer's 
control, a court may not revoke probation and order imprisonment without first 
considering alternative methods to address the violation"). For example, one option 
would be to civilly commit Mr. Arvizu pursuant to I.C. § 66-329, so he could be 
evaluated and medicated. 
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2001 ). If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district 
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
§ 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529. 
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not 
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, 
deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has 
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order. State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994 ). 
Here, Mr. Arvizu was doing exceptionally well on probation. His probation officer 
acknowledged that, "[i]n general, Mr. Arvizu is compliant with the terms and conditions 
of his probation, he reports in a timely manner to his supervising probation officer when 
instructed to do so and he maintains an open line of communication with his supervising 
probation officer." (Supp. R., p.89.) Despite this information, and the fact that, 
"Mr. Arvizu maintains a current balance with his fines, fees, restitution, and cost of 
supervision," the probation officer filed a probation violation report, based on what he 
perceived to be a "potential threat" posed by Mr. Arvizu because he has been 
diagnosed with mental illness and he was not presently taking medications. (Supp. 
R., p.89.) Specifically, the probation officer's report noted, "[w]hile Mr. Arvizu is 
generally compliant with the terms and conditions of his probation, he poses a potential 
threat to himself and to the community in general. Mr. Arvizu has been diagnosed with 
a serious mental illness and refuses to take his medication as prescribed. Although he 
has not exhibited any violent behavior since his instant offense, his current behavior 
(not taking his prescribed medication) poses a risk for potential violent behavior without 
notice." (Supp. R., p.89.) 
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Substantial information regarding Mr. Arvizu's mental health was known by the 
district court at Mr. Arvizu's initial sentencing hearing on July 2, 2013 (see PSI, pp.11-
34, 94-135, 142-174), yet the court still opted to place Mr. Arvizu on probation. 
(R., pp.80-85.) At the time of sentencing, the district court was even aware that 
Mr. Arvizu had been released from a mental commitment (I.C. § 18-212) at State 
Hospital South just three months prior. (R., pp.53-54.) Thus, there were no changed 
circumstances which would justify revocation. 
Further, Mr. Arvizu does not have any prior felony convictions. (PSI, pp.6-7.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be accorded 
more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 
(Ct App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 
89, 91 (1982). 
Finally, Mr. Arvizu served in the military many years ago. (PSI, p.8.) In State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982), the court found the defendant's honorable discharge 
from the military to be a factor in mitigation of sentence. Mr. Arvizu was honorably 
discharged after serving in the Air Force for 21 years. (PSI, p.8.) 
In making the decision to revoke Mr. Arvizu's probation, the district court said: 
And, as I sit here in light of the, you know, the nature of the violation at 
issue and what went on between you and your probation officer and the 
VA, with respect to that situation, in light of your comments here today that 
you don't believe you have any mental-health condition that needs to be 
addressed, I just don't see how I can conclude that you don't present a 
risk to the community presently. 
(4/10/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.13-20.) Mr. Arvizu pointed out to the court that he didn't commit 
any crimes or cause any problems when he was out on probation. (4/10/15 Tr., p.17, 
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L.21 - p.18, L.4.) Nevertheless, the district court revoked Mr. Arvizu's probation. 
(4/10/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.13-18.) 
Mr. Arvizu's purported violation did not justify revoking probation in light of the 
goals of rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society could be best served by 
his continued supervision under the probation department. 
11. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Arvizu's Equal Protection And Due Process Rights Under 
The Idaho And U.S. Constitutions When It Revoked His Probation Simply Because It 
Believed Mr. Arvizu Was Mentally Ill And Should Be Taking Medication For The 
Condition 
A. Introduction 
Although the district court recognized that Mr. Arvizu was doing well on 
probation, the court found that Mr. Arvizu was potentially a risk to the community 
because he was not acknowledging that he had a mental health condition and was not 
taking mental health medication. Therefore, the district court revoked Mr. Arvizu's 
probation. This decision violated Mr. Arvizu's rights to equal protection and due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Sections 2 and 13 because, had 
Mr. Arvizu not been diagnosed with a mental health condition, he would have remained 
on probation. 
B. The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By Revoking Mr. Arvizu's 
Probation Because It Believed Mr. Arvizu Was Mentally Ill And Should Be Taking 
Medication 
The appellate courts will only review errors that were not objected to below if the 
error was fundamental. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). An error is 
fundamental if it: 
13 
Id. 
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the 
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. If the 
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error 
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and 
remand. 
Preliminarily, the district court's decision to revoke probation was fundamental 
error. First, the district court violated Mr. Arvizu's unwaived equal protection and due 
process rights by revoking probation, after previously determining that probation was an 
appropriate sentence, simply because it believed Mr. Arvizu was mentally ill and was 
not taking medication for his diagnosed condition. (4/10/15 Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.3, 
p.15, L.19 - p.16, L.21, p.17, Ls.13-20.) Second, that violation plainly exists on the 
record. (See 4/3/15, Tr.; 4/10/15 Tr.) Finally, that violation was not harmless because, 
absent that violation, Mr. Arvizu would be on probation rather than serving a prison 
sentence. 
C. The District Court Denied Mr. Arvizu Equal Protection And Due Process By 
Incarcerating Him Simply Because It Believed Mr. Arvizu Was Mentally Ill And 
Should Be Taking Mental Health Medications 
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees "equal protection of the laws," U.S. 
Const., amend. XIV, while Article I, Section 2 provides that the "[g]overnment is 
instituted for [the people's] equal protection and benefit." The Due Process Clause and 
Article I, Section 13 prohibit the state from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." Courts "generally analyze the fairness of 
relationships between the criminal defendant and the State under the Due Process 
Clause, while [courts] approach the question whether the State has invidiously denied 
one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants 
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under the Equal Protection Clause." State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 609 (Ct. App. 
2007) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983).) 
However, in this context, the analysis is the same: 
Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue 
cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but 
rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as "the nature of the 
individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality 
of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the 
existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose .... " 
Braaten, 144 Idaho at 609 (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666-667). 
Probationers have a protected liberty interest in continuing probation, and so, 
retain some level of right to due process. See e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
480-481 (1972); State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766 (2007). Probationers have an 
obvious interest in retaining their conditional liberty, and the State also has an interest in 
assuring that revocation proceedings are based on accurate findings of fact and, where 
appropriate, the informed exercise of discretion." Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 
(1985). 
The status of being mentally ill cannot be made a criminal offense for which a 
person can be prosecuted and imprisoned See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
666 (1962) (holding that a statute which imprisons a person who is addicted to 
narcotics, even though he has never touched any narcotic within the state, inflicts a 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). "Mental 
illness is simply that, an illness, and should be treated no differently than other illnesses 
and with due respect for personal liberties." In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. 
1994 ). However, a state may, in a civil proceeding, adjudicate the status of mental 
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illness and require involuntary confinement of the mentally ill person for treatment and 
the protection of society. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). 
The district court violated Mr. Arvizu's due process right by incarcerating him 
simply because he had been diagnosed with a mental health condition which the court 
believed he should acknowledge and medicate. First, Mr. Arvizu had a constitutionally-
protected interest in remaining on probation. "[T]o obtain a protectable right 'a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than 
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead have a legitimate claim to entitlement to 
it."'. State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143 (2001) (quoting Gree.nholtz v. Inmate of 
Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Idaho courts have recognized a due 
process right in probation revocation proceedings: 
Upon the valid conviction and sentencing of a defendant, due process 
having been provided, the state may deprive the defendant of his liberty 
for the term of the sentence pronounced by the district judge. If the state 
chooses to give a prisoner back some of his liberty or a right to his liberty 
by granting him parole, probation, good time credits, or an expectation of 
parole, the state must once again provide the prisoner with due process 
before removing the liberty. 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 143 (internal citations omitted). 
Here, Mr. Arvizu did have a due process right at his probation violation hearing 
and at the disposition hearing. The only probation condition Mr. Arvizu was found to 
have violated was not obtaining a mental health evaluation. (4/3/15 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) 
At disposition, the district court recognized that Mr. Arvizu was doing well on probation, 
but found that Mr. Arvizu was potentially a risk to the community because he was not 
acknowledging his previous diagnosis and taking medication for it. (4/10/15 Tr., p.17, 
L.13 - p.17, L.20.) Mr. Arvizu then pointed out to the court that he did nott commit any 
crimes or cause any problems when he was out on probation. (4/10/15 Tr., p.14, L.13-
16 
p.18, LA.) Notwithstanding, the district court revoked Mr. Arvizu's probation. (4/10/15 
, p.18, Ls.13-18.) 
Thus, Mr. Arvizu did have a legitimate claim to continue on probation, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections applied to the district court's decision 
to revoke probation. See Coasso/o, 136 Idaho at 143. 
Second, the court's decision to revoke probation was not rationally related to the 
various legitimate government interests at play in this case. Idaho's interests at 
sentencing are ensuring public safety, followed by rehabilitation, deterrence, and 
retribution. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011). Idaho also has an interest in 
treating mentally ill defendants, rather than incarcerating such defendants for a 
substantial period of time. State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 369-370 (Ct App. 2008). 
But the classification drawn here-probation-worthy defendants with a mental health 
diagnosis versus probation-worthy defendants without a mental diagnosis-is not 
rationally related to any of those interests. That distinction in fact undermines the 
state's interest in rehabilitating and providing for individuals with mental illness. 
Ultimately, the district court treated Mr. Arvizu, as a probation-worthy defendant 
with a diagnosed mental health condition, differently than probation-worthy defendants 
without a mental health condition. The district court inserted its own belief that 
Mr. Arvizu must acknowledge and medicate his condition in order to be successful on 
probation. Yet, Mr. Arvizu was having a successful probation. Notably, Mr. Arvizu had 
not shown himself as dangerous or unwell during his time on probation-in fact, his 
probation officer reported that Mr. Arvizu was compliant on probation. (Supp. R., p.89.) 
Therefore, the district court violated Mr. Arvizu's equal protection and due process rights 
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by incarcerating him simply because he had been diagnosed with a mental health 
condition. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Arvizu respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an order 
that he be placed back on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Arvizu asks this Court to vacate 
the order revoking his probation and remand the case for a new hearing. 
DATED this 12th day of November, 2015. 
Deputy State App:i: Public Defender 
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